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Abstract: Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between 
developed and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual property 
rights did not pay much attention to this aspect. We show that whether or not the 
incumbent and the entrant final goods producers are from the same developed 
country, patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare 
if (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods 
market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final 
goods producers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between 
the incumbent and the entrant developing-country firms is sufficiently high.  
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Under the current WTO (World Trade Organization) regime, an important issue is the 
standardization (and strengthening) of patent systems across countries, and it has 
gathered momentum due to the Dunkel proposal in connection with Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). An important aspect of this standardization 
process is to strengthen patent protection in the developing countries. 
  The quest for finding out the effects of patent protection in the developing 
countries on the innovation of the developed countries and social welfare has created 
a vast theoretical literature in recent decades (Chin and Grossman, 1990, Segerstrom 
et al., 1990, Diwan and Rodrik, 1991, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Deardorff, 
1992, Taylor, 1994, Vishwasrao, 1994, Fosfuri, 2000, Markusen, 2001, Glass and 
Saggi, 2002 and Sinha, 2006). Surprisingly, the existing literature did not pay much 
attention to the vertical relationship between the developed and developing country 
firms, while this relationship is very common in today’s world.  
The tremendous growth of international outsourcing, which helps the 
developed-country firms to buy part or all of the outputs from the developing 
countries, certainly creates the need for considering vertical relationships between the 
firms. A large body of empirical evidence shows that vertical knowledge transfer 
occurs as firms from industrialized countries have bought outputs of firms from Asian 
newly industrialized countries (Hobday, 1995). As mentioned in Pack and Saggi 
(2001), Radio Shack and Texas Instruments have commissioned firms from newly 
industrialized countries to produce components or entire products, which have been 
sold under the name of the retailers. The results of extensive interviews in Korea in   2
the late 1970s show that almost half of the firms in the sample benefitted from the 
technical information provided by the foreign buyers (Rhee et al., 1984). Keesing 
(1982) found that, in Korea and Taiwan in the late 1970s, importers maintained a very 
large staffs based in the countries, which spent considerable time with their local 
manufacturers. Hou and Gee (1993) also confirm significant technology transfer by 
developed country importers to the producers from newly industrialized countries. 
The evidences on vertical technology transfer can also be found in Javorcik (2004) 
and Blalock and Gertler (2008). 
Given the widespread phenomenon of vertical technology transfers between 
developed and developing country firms, we show how patent protection in the 
developing country affects developed-country welfare in the presence of vertical 
technology transfer, through its impact on market structure. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper which analyzes the effects of patent protection in the 
presence of vertical technology transfer.
1 Under vertical technology transfer, a 
developed country firm transfers its technology to a developing country firm, which 
produces the product for the developed country firm. However, vertical technology 
transfer may create competition in the developing country by creating knowledge 
spillover, which, in turn, may create entry in the final goods market. We show that 
whether or not the incumbent and the entrant final goods producers are from the same 
country, patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare 
if (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods 
                                                 
1 Pack and Saggi (2001) show the implications of vertical technology transfer on the profitability of 
developed-country firms. However, they neither consider endogenous entry in the final goods market 
nor consider welfare implications of patent protection in the developing country. Even if they consider 
both monopoly and duopoly product-market structure, entry decision in the product market is not 
endogenous in their analysis. Goh (2005) extends Pack and Saggi (2001) to endogenize technological 
effort of the developing firm, which is receiving the technology from the developed country firm. Lin 
and Saggi (2007) show how contractual relationship between a multinational and a local firm affects 
backward linkages between the firms and welfare in the local industry.    3
market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final 
goods producers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between 
the incumbent and the entrant developing-country firms is sufficiently high. We also 
show that patent protection in the developing country may increase or reduce the 
profit of the developed-country firm. 
It is now worth relating our result with an earlier work by Klemperer (1988), 
which shows that entry in a Cournot oligopoly reduces welfare if the marginal cost of 
the entrant final goods producer is sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of the 
incumbent final goods producer. However, he does not consider a vertical structure. 
In contrast, in a vertical structure, we show that entry, which is due to knowledge 
spillover under no patent protection, reduces welfare (or patent protection increase 
welfare) if the marginal costs of the incumbent and the entrant final goods producers 
are close enough. Even if both Klemperer (1988) and our paper show that entry can 
reduce welfare, the industrial structures under which entry reduces welfare differ 
between these papers. Hence, whether an economy will design policies to restrict 
entry depends not only on the cost asymmetries between the firms but also on factors 
such as vertical technology transfer under international outsourcing.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
We adopt the model from Pack and Saggi (2001). Assume that there is a firm, called 
firm 1, in a developed country, called country 1. Firm 1 has a technology to produce a 
particular product, which has a demand in country 1. The profit firm 1 can earn by 
producing in country 1 is normalized to zero. We assume that firm 1 transfers its   4
technology to firm 2, which is a producer in a developing country, called country 2. 
Firm 2 can produce the output at the marginal cost  1 c , which is assumed to be zero 
for simplicity. However, technology transfer to firm 2 may create knowledge spillover 
in country 2, which allows firm 3 to compete with firm 2 at the constant marginal cost 
0 ≥ c .
2 Hence,  0 > c  captures the idea that knowledge spillover in country 2 can be 
imperfect. Though firm 1 could lose control over its technology, we assume that firms 
2 and 3 do not have enough marketing skills to sell the product in the final goods 
market. As a result, firm 1 does not face any threat of competition in the product-
market from firms 2 and 3. 
  Assume that there is a potential entrant in the final goods market, call firm 4, 
who cannot produce the product, yet can compete with firm 1 by purchasing the 
product from firms 2 and 3. We assume that either firm 4 modifies the product 
slightly or firms 2 and 3 modify the production process slightly for firm 4, thus 
avoiding the patent laws in country 1. To show our results in the simplest way, we 
assume that the consumers view the products of firms 1 and 4 as perfect substitutes, 
but the constant marginal cost of firm 4 is  0 ≥ d . This cost difference between firms 1 
and 4 may capture the costs involved in non-infringing imitation. Further, if firm 4 
wants to enter the market, it needs to incur a fixed entry cost, E . In the following 
analysis, we will consider two situations: (1) where firm 4 is from country 1, (2) 
where firm 4 is not from country 1. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 transfers its technology to 
firm 2. At stage 2, firm 4 decides whether to enter the market or not. At stage 3, firm 
2 chooses its output if there is patent protection in country 2, and the outputs are sold 
at the per-unit price w to firm 1 in the case of no entry by firm 4, and to firms 1 and 4 
                                                 
2 It is implicit in our analysis that the cost of extra technology transfer prevents firm 1 to transfer its   5
in the case of entry by firm 4. If there is no patent protection in country 2, thus 
creating knowledge spillover in country 2, at stage 2, both firms 2 and 3 produce the 
outputs like Cournot duopolists, and the outputs are sold at the per-unit price w to 
either firm 1 or to firms 1 and 4 depending on entry of firm 4. At stage 4, firm 1 
determines its output and the profits are realized if firm 4 does not enter. If firm 4 
enters, firms 1 and 4 determine the outputs like Cournot duopolists. We solve the 
game through backward induction. 
  Assume that the inverse market demand function in country 1 is 
  q P − =1 ,           ( 1 )  
where P  is price and q is the total output. 
 
2.1. Patent protection in country 2 
Let us first consider the situation with patent protection in country 2, thus creating no 
knowledge spillover in country 2. In this situation, only firm 2 produces in country 2. 
  If firm 4 does not enter, firm 1 chooses its output to maximize the following 
expression: 
  1 1 ) 1 (
1
q w q Max
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The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. Equation (3) creates the 
inverse derived demand curve  I q w 2 1− =   for firm 2. 
Firm 2 produces its output by maximizing the following expression: 
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technology to more than one firm in country 2. This is in line with Pack and Saggi (2001).   6




2 = I q .           ( 5 )  
The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
  The price paid by firm 1 is 
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Welfare of country 1, which is the sum of the total profit of the firms in country 1 and 
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   Let us now consider the case where firm 4 enters the market. In this situation, 
firms 1 and 4 maximize the following expressions respectively to determine their 
outputs: 
   1 4 1 ) 1 (
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q w q q Max
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− − −         ( 8 )  
  4 4 1 ) 1 (
4
q w d q q Max
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− − − − .         ( 9 )  
Since the entry cost is sunk at the output choice stage, it does not enter into the 
optimization problem (9). 
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The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. The equilibrium outputs of 
firms 1 and 4 in (10) give the inverse derived demand curve 
2
3 2 I q d
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=   for firm 
2. 
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The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
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We assume that 
7
2
< d ,                           (14) 
which ensures that, upon entry, the outputs of both firms 1 and 4 are positive. 
The net equilibrium profits of firms 1 and 4 are respectively 
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It is immediate from (15) that, if there is patent protection in country 2, entry occurs 
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if firm 4 is from country 1, but it is 
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if firm 4 is not from country 1. 
 
2.2. No patent protection in country 2 
Now consider the situation with no patent protection in country 2. No patent 
protection in country 2 creates knowledge spillover and may induce firm 3 to enter 
the market in country 2. Since we are not interested in welfare of country 2, and want 
entry in country 2 whenever it is allowed by the patent law, we assume away any cost 
of entry for firm 3. Hence, under no patent protection in country 2, firm 3 always 
enters both firms 2 and 3 produce in country 2. 
  If firm 4 does not enter and firm 1 produces like monopolist in the final goods 
market, the inverse derived demand curve faced by firms 2 and 3 is given by (3), 
which is  I q w 2 1− = . 
Firms 2 and 3 produce their outputs to maximize the following expressions 
respectively: 
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The second order conditions for maximization are satisfied. We assume that 
2
1
< c , 
which ensures positive outputs by both firms 2 and 3. 
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Welfare of country 1 is 
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   Now consider the case where firm 4 enters the market. In this situation, the 
inverse derived demand curve for firms 2 and 3 is given by (10), which is 
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The second order conditions for maximization are satisfied. We assume that 
c d 4 2− < , which ensures positive output by both firms 2 and 3. 
  The price paid by firms 1 and 4 is 
6
2 2 * c d
w
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which ensures that, upon entry, the outputs of both firms 1 and 4 are positive. Note 
that condition (14) is stricter than condition (27) if 
7
3
< c . That is, upon entry, the   10
output of firm 4 is more likely to be positive under no patent protection in country 2 if 
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The net equilibrium profits of firms 1 and 4 are respectively 
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It is immediate from (28) that, if there is patent protection in country 2, entry occurs 











4 π .                    (29) 
Under entry of firm 4, welfare of country 1 is 
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c d c d c d
W −
− − + − − + − +
=
324
) 2 2 4 ( 2 ) 2 11 4 ( ) 2 7 4 (
2 2 2
1 ,          (30a) 
if firm 4 is from country 1, and it is 
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if firm 4 is not from country 1. 
 
Proposition 1:  The incentive for entry in country 1 is higher under no patent 
protection in country 2 compared to patent protection in country 2. 
Proof: The gross profit of firm 4 is higher under no patent protection in country 2 
than under patent protection in country 2, i.e., 
144
) 7 2 (
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c d 4 2− < , which is satisfied due to requirement for the positive output by firm 3 in 
(25). Q.E.D. 
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  No patent protection in country 2 induces firm 3 to enter the market, thus 
reducing the price paid by the firms in country 1 and increasing the gross profits of 
firms 1 and 4. Thus, no patent protection in country 2 (compared to patent protection 
in country 2) makes entry by firm 4 more profitable. 
  Let us now consider the implications of patent protection in country 2 on 
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< , that if patent protection in country 2 does not affect the final goods 
market structure, welfare of country 1 is higher under no patent protection in country 
2 than under patent protection in country 2. The reason for this result is easy to 
understand. If patent protection neither affects a firm’s incentive for innovation 
(which happens in our analysis) nor affects the final goods market structure, no patent 
protection increases welfare by reducing the price paid by the final goods producers, 
thus reducing the deadweight loss. However, we will show below that even if patent 
protection does not affect the incentive for innovation, it is welfare improving if it 
affects the final goods market structure, and this happens whether or not firm 4 is 
from country 1. 
It may worth noting that, if the patent protection in country 2 does not affect 
the final goods market structure, firm 1 earns higher profit under no patent protection 
(compared to patent protection) in country 2. This can be found by comparing (6) and 
(21), and (15) and (28). This result implies that in the presence of vertical technology 
transfer no patent protection in country 2 increasers firm 1’s incentive for inventing a 
technology by raising its gross profit compared to the situation with patent protection 
in country 2. However, a crucial assumption behind this result is that patent protection   12
in country 2 does not affect the market structure. We show below that the result may 
change if patent protection affects the market structure. 
  Now, consider the situation where  )
324
) 2 11 4 (
,
144
) 7 2 (
(
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E
− − −
∈ , i.e., firm 
4 enters only if there is no patent protection in country 2. In this situation, (7) and 
(30a) are the relevant welfare expressions to compare if firm 4 is from country 1. The 
comparison of (7) and (30a) shows that welfare of country 1 is higher under patent 
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Since left hand side (LHS) of (31) is increasing in E , welfare of country 1 can be 
higher under patent protection in country 2 compared to no patent protection in 
country 2 provided condition (31) is satisfied at least for 
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If  c d = , condition (32) does not hold in the relevant range of c, which is 
7
2
< c , 
where the outputs of the firms are positive. 
  Note that LHS of (32) is increasing in c over  ]
2
1
, 0 [ . We get that if  0 = c , (32) 





welfare of country 1 is higher under no patent protection in country 2 compared to 
patent protection in country 2 if c is at its minimum value 0 .   13
  Now, consider the case where 
2
1
→ c . In this situation, the relevant value of 
0 → d . This is because, if 
2
1
→ c , entry occurs in country 1 if  0 → d . We get that 
(32) holds for 
2
1
→ c  and  0 → d . As c falls from 
2
1
, the relevant value of d  
increases from 0 , and (32) holds provided c is not very small. In general, 
0 ) 2 2 4 ( 16 ) 2 7 4 ( 8 243
2 2 = − − − − + − c d c d  can have a positive real root 
76
64 256 85 2 3 8 16
2 c c c
d
− + − + + −
=  provided c is not very small. Hence, patent 
protection (compared to no patent protection) in country 2 increases welfare of 
country 1 if c is sufficiently high and d  is sufficiently small. 
  It is worth mentioning that if we evaluate condition (31) at 
144





and consider  0 = d  and 
2
1
0 < ≤ c , welfare of country 1 is higher under patent 
protection in country 2 compared to no patent protection in country 2 if c is 
sufficiently high. However, (31) does not hold at 
144




=  if either  c d =  or 
0 = c  and 
7
2
0 < ≤ d . Hence, patent protection (compared to no patent protection) in 
country 2 increases welfare of country 1 if patent protection in country 2 deters entry 
of firm 4, c is sufficiently high and d  is sufficiently small. 
  The above discussion gives the following proposition immediately. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3 If  0 = c , the relevant values of d , which ensure positive outputs, are given by 
7
2
0 < ≤ d .   14
Proposition 2: Assume that the potential entrant in the final goods market is from 
country 1. Patent protection in country 2 increases welfare of country 1 compared to 
no patent protection in country 2 if (i) patent protection deters entry in the final goods 
market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final 
goods producers (which is given by d) is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost 
difference between the incumbent and the entrant in country 2 (which is given by c) is 
sufficiently high.  
 
 If  c is very high, no patent protection in country 2 does not significantly 
reducing the price paid by the final goods producers compared to no patent protection 
in country 2. Further, if patent protection deters entry when d  is very small, it implies 
that the cost of entry is significantly high, thus imposing significant cost on country 1. 
As a result, the higher entry cost outweighs the extra gain from competition, thus 
reducing welfare of country 1 under no patent protection in country 2 compared to 
patent protection in country 2. 
  It is worth noting that the effect of patent protection in country 2 has an 
ambiguous effect on the profit of firm 1. It follows from (6) and (28) that the profit of 
firm 1 is higher under “patent protection in country 2 with no entry by firm 4” 






. We also get 
that the parameter values where patent protection in country 2 increases welfare of 
country 1 provide higher profit of firm 1 under patent protection in country 2 
compared to no patent protection in country 2. 
  It is now easy to see how patent protection (compared to no patent protection) 
in country 2 affects welfare of country 1 if firm 4 is not from country 1 and   15
)
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(
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E
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∈ . If firm 4 is not from country 1, the net profit of firm 
4 does not appear in the welfare calculation of country 1, and (7) and (30b) are 
relevant welfare expressions for country 1. However, it must be noted that this 
situation is similar to the previous case where firm 4 is from country 1 but 
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= , so that the net profit of firm 4 does not affect welfare of country 
1. In this situation, welfare of country 1 is higher under patent protection in country 2 
than no patent protection in country 2 if 
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As shown above, condition (33) is not satisfied for c = 0, while it is satisfied for 
2
1
→ c  and  0 → d . In general,  0 ) 2 2 4 ( 16 ) 2 7 4 ( 8 243
2 2 = − − − − + − c d c d  has a 
positive real root 
76
64 256 85 2 3 8 16
2 c c c
d
− + − + + −
=  if c is not very small. 
Hence, if firm 4 is not from country 1, patent protection in country 2 increases welfare 
of country 1 compared to no patent protection in country 2 if the conditions similar to 
Proposition 2 is satisfied, i.e., patent protection in country 2 deters entry in the final 
goods market, c is sufficiently high and d  is sufficiently small.  
  If firm 4 is not from country 1, the profit of firm 4 does not affect welfare of 
country 1. However, entry of firm 4 under no patent protection reduces firm 1’s profit 
compared to patent protection in country 2. Further, firm 1’s loss of profit following 
entry of firm 4 increases as d reduces. On the other hand, entry in country 2 under no 
patent protection helps the final goods producers by reducing the price paid by them. 
However, if c is very high, the benefit of entry in country 2 due to the lower price 
paid by the final goods producers is not significant. Hence, if c is very high and d is   16
very small, patent protection (compared to no patent protection) increases welfare of 
country 1 by deterring entry in the final goods market. 
 
3. Conclusion 
There is a vast literature examining the rationale for extending patent protection in 
developing countries. However, that literature did not pay much attention to the 
vertical relationship between developed and developing country firms, while 
empirical evidences indicate that vertical technology transfer is quire pervasive.  
We analyze how patent protection in a developing country affects welfare of 
the developed country through its impact on market structure. We show that patent 
protection in the developing country increase welfare of the developed country only if 
it prevents entry in the final goods market. The marginal cost differences between the 
incumbent and the entrant final goods producers and between the incumbent and the 
entrant producers in the developing country also play important role in improving 
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